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Consent Engendered:' A Feminist Critique of
Consensual Fourth Amendment Searches
Dr. Dana Raigrodski*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.2
While a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable
cause is generally "per se unreasonable," 3 the general rule is subject to "a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. ' 4 One of the
specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant
and probable cause is a search conducted based on consent.5 I will argue
that the Court constructs the notion of consent (and its opposite -
* SJD, 2002, Tulane Law School; LL.M., 1998, Tulane University; LL.B., 1995, Tel-
Aviv University. This Article is based on a chapter from my doctorial dissertation, A
Feminist Fourth Amendment - Transforming Search and Seizure Law (2002) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Tulane University) (on file with author). My gratitude to Professors
Stephen M. Griffin, Wendy Brown Scott, and Catherine Hancock for their guidance in this
research project.
1. Minow, Martha, The Supreme Court, 1986-Forward: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. Rv. 10 (1987).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
4. Id.
5. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
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coercion) from a male perspective, which maintains social structures of
domination and power disparities and perpetuates the subordination of
women, minorities, and other disempowered members of society. As
feminists have demonstrated, the line between consent and coercion,
between agency and victimization, is neither clear nor neutral. Hence, the
uncritical deployment of consent itself to legitimize searches and seizures
is problematic and oppressive.
The uncritical use of consent within Fourth Amendment law is
especially oppressive because this exception threatens to overshadow the
rule and carries with it an enormous potential for abuse. Unlike the other
exceptions to the warrant requirement (and to the probable cause
requirement),6 the consent exception exempts not only the warrant
requirement but also the need for any other articulated justification for the
search. The Court's cases seem to convey the message that, absent
coercion, searches conducted pursuant to consent are per se reasonable
regardless of the practicability of obtaining a warrant or the existence of
any suspicion of misconduct. Moreover, the police are not even required to
inform the individual of his or her right to terminate the encounter or to
withhold consent to a requested search. Thus, it is not surprising that
obtaining the individual's consent to a search has become a widely utilized
investigative tool by the police. Hypothetically at least, the police could
decide to conduct a fishing expedition, going from door to door asking
politely for permission to search the house, in the hope of uncovering
evidence of illegal activity or just for the sake of monitoring the conduct of
the citizens of the United States. According to the current jurisprudence of
the Court, there is nothing that makes such conduct "unreasonable" and
therefore unconstitutional.
If the police are to succeed in these widespread arbitrary search
attempts, it will likely be, according to the Court, because of the result of
each individual voluntarily cooperating with the government. Since the
individual is by no means coerced by the police to consent to the search,
we, as a liberal democracy, must respect the citizen's free choice.
Traditional critics of the Court have argued that only informed consent, i.e.,
when the individual has knowingly relinquished his or her right to refuse to
give consent to search, is truly a voluntary consent. From a feminist
perspective, the core problem lies in the Court's sharp distinction and
tendency to find voluntary consent rather than coercion.
The Court's construction of consent and coercion disregards the
inherently coercive nature of all police-initiated encounters that undermine
6. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (searches incident to
arrest); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (searches under exigent
circumstances); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk searches); Harris v. United
States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (plain view searches); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925) (motor vehicle searches).
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the notion of a meaningful consent. Moreover, the dichotomy of consent-
coercion perpetuates patriarchal power structures that privilege, among
other things, the police in its encounter with the individual. This
dichotomy reflects a male perspective and is itself an artificial construct of
patriarchal ideology. As I will argue, the Court's consent-to-search cases
are driven by this patriarchal ideology to maintain social structures of
power disparities and to perpetuate the subordination of women, minorities,
and other disempowered members of society.
We need to acknowledge the power and submission paradigm that
underlies police-citizen encounters and to scrutinize the entire notion of
consent. In order to confront both power and consent, I will turn to
feminist critique of consent, particularly in the area of rape, and to feminist
writings about choice and agency. Based on these writings I will argue that
by distinguishing coerced consent to a search (which is not consent
altogether) from truly voluntary consent the Court renders invisible the
falsity of the dichotomy between coercion and choice and their interplay in
our patriarchal society.
Nonetheless, feminist theories maintain that choice and agency are
possible so long as they are understood as constrained and construed by
conditions of domination and by coercive forces. Yet, in the context of
searches and seizures, the Court ignores both this matrix and any acts of
agency within it. On one hand, the Court rejects the notion that any
systems of subordination are in place. On the other hand, it silences any
attempts to resist and escape these subordinating conditions. Consequently,
the legal and social patriarchal structures remain invisible and intact.
While we are all harmed by a society structured upon domination, women
and others who traditionally occupy a subordinated place are particularly
disadvantaged, in and outside of the realm of searches and seizures.
II. VOLUNTARY CONSENT OR COERCION?
In Bumper v. North Carolina,7 the issue presented was whether a
search could be justified as lawful on the basis of consent when that
consent has been given after the officer asserted that he possessed a
8
warrant. The Court held that there could be no consent under such
circumstances. 9 It first stated that a prosecutor has the burden of proving
that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.'0 This burden
7. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
8. Id. at 548. In this case, officers went to the house of Mrs. Leath, the petitioner's
grandmother with whom he lived, and announced they had a search warrant to search her
house. Id. at 546. Mrs. Leath responded: "Go ahead," and opened the door. Id. at 547. The
officers found a rifle later introduced as evidence against the defendant. Id. at 546. At the
suppression hearing the State argued it was not relying on a warrant to justify the search but
rather on Mrs. Leath's consent. Id.
9. Id. at 548.
10. Id.
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cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of
lawful authority." Accordingly, when an officer claims authority to search
a home under a warrant she announces in effect that the occupant has no
right to resist. In so holding, the Court relied on lower courts' cases to
underscore the aspects of obedience and submission to the authority of the
law that are inherent in this situation and create the tinge of coercion.
12
Finally, the Court concluded that "[tihe situation is instinct with coercion
- albeit colorably lawful coercion," and "[w]here there is coercion there
cannot be consent."'
13
The Court next addressed the question of how the prosecution may
demonstrate that consent is voluntarily given in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte.14 Turning for guidance to Fourteenth Amendment case law
about the determination of voluntariness of a defendant's confession, 5 the
Court held that the voluntariness of consent is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of the circumstances. 16 These circumstances
may include such factors as the youth of the suspect, lack of education, low
intelligence, and lack of any advisement to the suspect of his constitutional
rights.' 7 However, while knowledge of the right to refuse consent is a
relevant factor, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such
knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.'
8
The Court emphasized the idea that consent cannot be coerced,
explicitly or implicitly, by implied threat or by covert force.19 If under all
the circumstances it appears that the consent was not given voluntarily -
that it was coerced by threats, or force, or granted only in submission to a
11. Id. at 548-49.
12. Id. at 549 n.14. The Court first quoted from Bull v. Armstrong:
One is not held to have consented to the search of his premises where it
is accomplished pursuant to an apparently valid search warrant . . . the
legal effect is that consent is on the basis of such a warrant and his
permission is construed as an intention to abide by the law and not resist
the search under the warrant, rather than an invitation to search.
48 So. 2d 467, 470 (Ala. 1990). It also quoted from Meno v. State:
One who, upon the command of an officer ... opens the door to the
officer and acquiesces in obedience to such a request, no matter by what
language used in such acquiescence, is but showing a regard for the
supremacy of the law .... The presentation of a search warrant ... is
tinged with coercion, and submission thereto cannot be considered an
invitation that would waive the constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, but rather is to be considered a submission to the
law.
164 N.E. 93, 96 (Ind. 1925).
13. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550.
14. 412 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1973).
15. Id. at 223-27.
16. Id. at 227, 248-49.
17. Id. at 226, 248.
18. Id. at 227, 248-49.
19. Id. at 228.
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claim of lawful authority as in Bumper - the consent is invalid and the
search unreasonable.2 ° Searches that are the product of police coercion can
therefore be filtered out without undermining the continuing validity of
consent searches.21 The Court thus created a dichotomy between coercion
and voluntary consent, and drew a bright line between those "rare"
instances where consent is coerced by threats, force, or claim of authority
and all other "consensual" police encounters where consent to a search is
deemed voluntary and valid.
Schneckloth exemplified, in the Court's opinion, an instance where no
coercion was inherent and there was no reason to believe that the consent to
the search was presumptively coerced.22 In this case, the vehicle was
legally stopped at 2:40 a.m., for a burnt-out headlight and license plate
light. The six men in the car appeared to be Hispanic,23 and of those only
Alcala, a passenger, produced a driver's license at the officer's request.
Alcala explained to the officer that the car belonged to his brother. After
the men complied with the officer's request to step out of the car and two
additional policemen arrived, the officer asked Alcala if he could search the
car. Alcala replied: "Sure, go ahead." The atmosphere, according to the
officer's uncontradicted testimony, was "very congenial," no one was
threatened with arrest, and no crime was discussed. The driver, Gonzales,
testified that the officer asked Alcala, "Does the trunk open?" Alcala
answered "Yes," got the keys from the car, and opened the trunk. Both
Gonzales and the officer testified that Alcala's assent to the search was
freely, even casually given.24 The Court concluded that these were clearly
circumstances where consent was freely given without coercion or
submission to authority.
25
Since in Schneckloth the lawfulness of the initial stop was not in
dispute, it did not factor into the Court's analysis of the consented-to-
search that followed. In its subsequent cases, however, the determination
of the voluntariness of the consent to search largely depended on the
preceding detention. If it amounted to an unlawful seizure, then the
subsequent search was invalid under the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine. If, on the other hand, the detention was relegated to the realm of
consensual encounters, the subsequent consent to the search typically was
deemed voluntary as well.
For example, in United States v. Mendenhal26 the Court considered
whether an encounter in an airport was a lawful seizure. Assuming that it
20. Id. at 233-34.
21. Id. at 229.
22. Id. at 247.
23. See David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the
Fourth Amendment, SuP. CT. REV. 271, 322 n.238 (1997).
24. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 220-2 1.
25. Id. at 221.
26. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
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was lawful, the question remained whether the defendant consented
voluntarily to further intrusion by the police. The Court relied on
Schneckloth in holding that the non-verbal consent of Mendenhall to
accompany the agents to the DEA office, followed by her consent to a
strip-search, was uninfected by an unlawful detention, 27 and thus was
voluntary based on the totality of the circumstances.28 The Court found
Mendenhall's consent to accompany the agents to be voluntary because she
was simply asked if she would accompany the agents; because there were
no threats or show of force; because the initial questioning at the concourse
was brief; and because her ticket and identification were returned to her
beforehand. 29 The consent to the strip search that followed was also freely
and voluntarily given because Mendenhall, a 22-year-old with an 1 Ith grade
education, was plainly capable of a knowing consent. She was expressly
told twice that she could decline to consent to the search, before expressly
consenting to it. Plus the agents themselves informed her she was free to
withhold consent, which substantially lessened the probability that their
30
conduct could reasonably have appeared to her as coercive.
The Court rejected the argument that Mendenhall in fact resisted the
search when, in response to being told that the search would require her to
disrobe, she stated that she had a plane to catch, characterizing the
comment simply as an expression of concern that the search be conducted
quickly. 3 The Court also rejected the argument that Mendenhall would not
have voluntarily consented to a search that was likely to disclose the
narcotics she was carrying. Instead the Court speculated that Mendenhall
may have thought she was acting in her self-interest by voluntarily
cooperating with the agents in the hope of receiving more lenient
treatment.32 Mendenhall's actual state of mind was not discussed.
By contrast, the dissent criticized the majority for concluding, based on
the absence of evidence that Mendenhall resisted her detention, that she
voluntarily consented to being taken to the DEA office despite having no
choice in the matter, and for presuming consent from a showing of
acquiescence to authority.33 Contrary to the majority, the dissent found that
Mendenhall was unlawfully seized, at least from the moment she was
escorted to the DEA office,34 thus rendering her consent to the search mere
27. Id. at 558-59.
28. Id. at 557-60.
29. Id. at 557-58.
30. Id. at 558-59.
31. Id. at 559.
32. Id. at 559, 559 n.7.
33. Id. at 566-67 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White emphasized that when asked
to go to the DEA office Ms. Mendenhall was not told that she could refuse to accompany
the agents to the office, and that there was no evidence of what Ms. Mendenhall said, if
anything, in response to that request. Id. at 575-76.
34. Id. at 574-75.
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acquiescence to police authority, analogous to Bumper.
35
In another airport case, Florida v. Royer,36 the issue of consent to the
search of Royer's suitcase also turned on whether the preceding detention
was an unlawful seizure. In contrast to Mendenhall, the Court concluded
that Royer was unlawfully seized when escorted to a police room, and
therefore held that his subsequent consent to the search was tainted with
illegality.3 7 The dissent, however, concluded that Royer voluntarily
consented to accompany the officers to the room, in a spirit of apparent
cooperation, and that his consent to the search was likewise voluntary.
Justice Rehnquist concluded,
Royer consented to go to the room .... [T]hat conclusion is
warranted by the totality of the circumstances [citation
omitted] .... Royer was not told that he had to go to the room
but was simply asked, after a brief period of questioning, if he
would accompany the detectives to the room .... There were
neither threats nor any show of force .... In fact Royer
admits that the detectives were quite polite . . . [in the room].
[He] simply continued to cooperate with the detectives as he
had from the beginning of the encounter.
38
In Florida v. Bostick,39 the Court employed the conflated "seizure
followed by consent to a search" analysis in the context of suspicionless
bus sweeps.4  Using circular reasoning, the Court considered factors
relevant to the determination of a voluntary consent to a search in deciding
whether Bostick was seized, which, in turn, reflected on the validity of his
later consent to a luggage search. The Court emphasized that Bostick
consented to the search of his bag after being informed of his right to
withhold consent.4 ' It also rejected Bostick's argument that he must have
been seized because no reasonable person would freely consent to a search
of luggage he or she knows contains drugs.4 2 The Court reiterated the rule
that the police may request consent to search luggage on a bus without
creating a seizure so long as the officers do not convey the message that
35. Id. at 557.
36. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
37. Id. at 501-03.
38. Id. at 530-32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
39. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
40. See, e.g., id. at 447 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[A]s the State concedes, and as the
majority purports to 'accept,' [citation omitted] if respondent was unlawfully seized when
the officers approached him and initiated questioning, the resulting search was likewise
unlawful no matter how well advised respondent was of his right to refuse it.") [citation
omitted].
41. Id. at 432. Bostick disputed both these facts, but the trial court resolved the
matter in favor of the state, and the Court took it at face value.
42. Id. at 437-38.
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compliance with their request is required.43  As Justice O'Connor
explained, "[c]learly, a bus passenger's decision to cooperate with law
enforcement officers authorizes the police to conduct a search.., only if
the cooperation is voluntary. Consent that is the product of official
intimidation or harassment is not consent at all.""
The Court has since declined to modify its rulings. In Ohio v.
Robinette,45 the Court refused to replace the totality-of-circumstances
voluntariness test with a per se rule that would require that the individual
be advised that they are free to go at the termination of a lawful seizure
before their consent to a search will be recognized as voluntary. 46 And in
2002, the Court in United States v. Drayton47 again rejected the suggestion
that police officers must always inform citizens of their right to refuse
when seeking permission.48
Drayton presented the Court with an opportunity to reconsider its
characterization of police-citizen encounters as balanced in power and as
typically wholly non-coercive. Throughout the years, the Court has been
sharply criticized by state and lower courts, by prominent legal scholars,
and from within for its unrealistic portrayal of police-initiated encounters,
and for taking too lightly the power imbalances between the police and the
individual, which would likely lead an individual to give his consent to a
search in most cases.49 Nevertheless, the Court maintained the fiction of
completely consensual police-encounters. Under circumstances similar to
those in Bostik, it stated,
everything that took place between Officer Lang and
[respondents] suggests that it was cooperative and that there
was nothing coercive [or] confrontational about the encounter.
There was no application of force, no intimidating movement,
no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons,
no blocking of exits, no threat, no command, not even an
43. Id. at 437.
44. Id. at 438.
45. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
46. Id. at 35, 40. In this case, the Court encountered what has become a widespread
police practice. At the conclusion of a lawful traffic stop, after a ticket had been issued and
the driver's license returned, the officer asked Robinette, "One question before you get
gone: [A]re you carrying any illegal contraband in your car? Any weapons of any kind,
drugs, anything like that?" to which Robinette responded "No." Thereupon the officer
asked if he could search the car and Robinette consented. Id. at 35-36. See also Ian D.
Midgley, Just One Question Before We Get to Ohio v. Robinette: "Are You Carrying Any
Contraband... Weapons, Drugs, Constitutional Protections ... Anything Like That? ", 48
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 173, 183-84 (1997).
47. 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
48. Id. at 207-08.
49. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
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authoritative tone of voice. 50
Consequently, Drayton and his companion Brown were not seized, and
their consent to the search of their luggage and their persons was deemed
voluntary.5
III. THE COERCIVE NATURE OF POLICE ENCOUNTERS:
THE FALSITY OF THE CONSENT-COERCION
DICHOTOMY EXPOSED
The Justices who dissent from the Court's consent opinions have
mostly focused their critique on the fact that the Court is willing to construe
uninformed consent as a meaningful consent and waiver of the individual's
Fourth Amendment rights.52 At least part of this critique is based on a
realistic assessment of the nature of the interchange between citizens and
the police,53 and on an understanding that "under many circumstances a
reasonable person might read an officer's 'May I' as the courteous
expression of a demand backed by the force of law.",54 Justice Marshall
even goes as far as to say that "[m]ost cases, in my view, are akin to
Bumper v. North Carolina: consent is ordinarily given as acquiescence in
an implicit claim of authority to search., 55 Justice Stevens made similar
observations in Ohio v. Robinette,56 and has recently emphasized in
Drayton,
50. Id. at 200.
51. Id. at 208.
52. See, e.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 275 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[V]erbal assent
to a search is not enough ... the fact that consent was given to the search does not imply
that the suspect knew that the alternative of a refusal existed."); Id. at 277 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("It wholly escapes me how our citizens can meaningfully be said to have
waived something as precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever being aware of its
existence."); Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I would have thought that the capacity to choose
necessarily depends upon knowledge that there is a choice to be made."); Id. at 284-85
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I have difficulty in comprehending how a decision made without
knowledge of available alternatives can be treated as choice at all. If consent to a search
means that a person has chosen to forgo his right to exclude the police from the place they
seek to search, it follows that his consent cannot be considered a meaningful choice unless
he knew that he could in fact exclude the police.").
53. Id. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 275-76 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Id. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Both
justices directly quote the same passage of the Court of Appeals opinion that the
Schneckloth majority overturned. Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir.
1971).
55. Id. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. 519 U.S. 33, 47-48 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The fact that this particular
officer successfully used a similar method of obtaining consent to search roughly 786 times
in one year [citation omitted], indicates that motorists generally respond in a manner that is
contrary to their self-interest. Repeated decisions by ordinary citizens to surrender that
interest cannot satisfactorily be explained on any hypothesis other than an assumption that
they believed they had a legal duty to do so.").
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The police not only carry legitimate authority but also
exercise power free from immediate check, and when the
attention of several officers is brought to bear on one civilian
the imbalance of immediate power is unmistakable. We all
understand this, as well as we understand that a display of
power rising to Justice Stewart's "threatening" level may
overbear a normal person's ability to act freely, even in the
absence of explicit commands or the formalities of detention.
As common as this understanding is, however, there is little
sign of it in the Court's opinion.
57
Many state courts and legal scholars share this criticism of the Court's
unrealistic characterization of consent searches.58 David Sklansky has
highlighted the fictitious thread of consent running through the Court's
police encounters and consensual search cases. 59 As Sklansky observes,
while the Court places considerable weight on the notion that
there is such a thing as a wholly noncoercive encounter with a
police officer, anyone who has ever been stopped by the
police knows that this is nonsense. Every encounter with a
uniformed officer necessarily involves some amount of
apprehension, and hence some amount of psychological if not
physical coercion. 6
0
hn Schneckloth, the Court chose to perpetuate the fiction that some
requests from police officers are wholly free from any "implied threat" or
57. 536 U.S. at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting).
58. See, e.g., William Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal
Procedure, 93 MIcH. L. REV. 1016, 1063 - 64 (1995) ("if the officer puts his command in
the form of a question, consent is deemed voluntary and the evidence comes in."); Tracey
Maclin, Seeing the Constitution From the Backseat of a Police Squad Car, 70 B.U. L. REV.
543, 547 (1990) ("1 too, approach questions involving police-citizen encounters with a
certain bias. I believe that many of these encounters are inherently unequal.") and Id. note
15 ("Confronting a police officer is not like confronting a civilian. Of course any individual
has a right to approach any other individual .... But it is not quite the same when the police
stop someone. There is authority in the approach of the police, and command in their tone.
I can ignore the ordinary person, but can I ignore the police?") (citing Reich, Police
Questioning Of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161, 1162 (1966)); Robert Ward,
Consensual Searches, The Fairytale that Became a Nightmare: Fargo Lessons Concerning
Police Initiated Encounters, 15 TouRO L. REV. 451, 464-465 (1999) ("Police initiated
encounters are inherently coercive ... The Court is comfortable ignoring reality. It assumes
that citizens retain a level of control and autonomy in police initiated encounters that is not
supported by the experiences of ordinary people. This willful blindness does not exist when
the discussion on consent, voluntariness and reasonable belief shifts to other areas of law
like contracts or property. In these areas, the law tends to be more sensitive to issues of
disparate power and the absence of meaningful choice.").
59. See generally Sklansky, supra note 23.
60. Id. at 318-19.
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"subtl[e]... coercion., 6 1 After Bostick, Robinette, and Drayton it is clear
that consent and voluntariness are, in the context of constitutional criminal
procedure, legal fictions.62
This criticism finds its support in psychological findings about
obedience to authority and uniform. Adrian Barrio has revisited Stanley
Milgram's experiments in obedience theory63 and applied those principles
to consent searches.64 Milgram's research, Barrio asserts, showed that
obedience to authority "is a deeply ingrained behavior tendency" in all
persons, "overriding training in ethics, sympathy, and moral conduct.,
65
Milgram argued that a variety of social forces prepare individuals for
obedience.6 6 As children, for example, most people are taught to obey
parental authority and teachers' authority. Both parents and teachers
reward compliance and punish disobedience, creating a system of
incentives and disincentives that overwhelmingly favors submission to
authority.
67
These experiences in turn define the individual's perception of
legitimate authority.6 8 Almost without fail "the power of the authority
stems not from personal characteristics but from [the authority figure's]
perceived position in a social structure.,, 69 Another experiment conducted
by Leonard Bickman further proved that "the degree to which a person
obeys authority largely depends upon the uniform worn by the authority
figure., 70 Based on Milgram's and Bickman's findings, Barrio argues that
the "'obedience phenomenon' operates in any situation involving clearly
defined authority figures and subordinates, 71 and that "a police officer's
seemingly innocuous request to search has remarkable coercive power."
7 2
The irrational behavior of guilty suspects consenting to searches in the face
of police authority, Barrio concludes, provides strong evidence that
individuals "attribute legitimacy to the police officer's uniform, and that
they obey police authority reflexively. 73
61. Id. at 319.
62. Id. at 320-21.
63. Milgram's experiments were originally designed to explain the unblinking
loyalty of lower-echelon Nazi war criminals.
64. Adrian Barrio, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedience
Theory Into the Supreme Court's Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV.
215.
65. Id. at 233-34.
66. Id. at 236.
67. Id.
68. Id. ("[A]uthority is contextually perceived and does not necessarily transcend the
situation in which it is encountered.")
69. Id.
70. Id. at 238.
71. Id. at 240.
72. Id. at 243.
73. Id.
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Other scholars have made similar arguments.74 For example, Robert
Ward intentionally places his analysis outside the context of police-
minority encounters, by using as an example a scene from the movie
Fargo. In that scene, the detained suspect, a white male, is being politely
questioned by a pregnant, uniformed white officer - obviously a member
of a less powerful group. Nonetheless, the suspect feels obligated to
cooperate with the officer's questioning.75 By using an example in which
the gender of the suspect supposedly empowers him as against the officer,
and in which racial tensions are not an issue, Ward is able to focus our
attention on the core issue of whether coercion and obedience to the
authority of the police are inherent to police-initiated encounters.
Like Barrio, Ward acknowledges that police initiated encounters are
inherently coercive, because it is a relationship constructed on disparate
power.76 Nonetheless, similar to the dissenting justices, both Barrio and
Ward think that requiring the officer to advise the suspect of his right to
withhold consent would overcome these coercive forces and the reflexive
obedience.77 I do not share their view. True, the giving of an 'informed'
consent is surely more meaningful than the giving of reflexive and ignorant
responses. But as Mendenhall demonstrates, knowledge of the right to
withhold consent and an opportunity to reflect, do not guarantee that
consent will be voluntary in a sense of manifesting free will and true
choice. Knowledge is not synonymous with unconstrained actual choice.
Women, for example, usually know that they have a right not to consent to
sex. In many cases however, particularly in the context of date or marital
rape or sexual harassment by employers, women nonetheless "consent,"
and submit to the socially empowered and domineering male even absent
an overt threat or force. We would not infer that in all of these cases
women consented to have sex in the sense of free choice and unconstrained
agency.
74. See, e.g., Robert Ward, Consensual Searches, The Fairytale that Became a
Nightmare: Fargo Lessons Concerning Police Initiated Encounters, 15 TOURO L. REV. 451
(1999); Catherine Twitero, The Future of Vehicle Consent Searches in Minnesota: State v.
George, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1155 (1998); see generally Midgley, supra note 46.
75. Ward, supra note 74, at 455-56.
76. Id. at 466.
77. See Barrio, supra note 64, at 247-48 ("To curb the coercive power of police
authority, the police officer should be required to advise the suspect of his right to withhold
consent prior to requesting his permission to search. Such a warning would combat the
obedience phenomenon by assuring the suspect both that he is under no obligation to give
consent and that the investigating officer is 'prepared to recognize this privilege.'
[W]amings would ensure that consent is 'in fact, freely and voluntarily given."'); Ward,
supra note 74, at 477 ("The combined forces of obedience to authority, the power of the
uniform and lower expectations of privacy make it imperative that citizens be told at the
outset that they do have a choice. If the concept of voluntariness and consent are to have
any meaning, then the Court should impose safeguards which will insure that the byproduct
of police initiated encounter indeed is voluntary and consensual."); Twitero, supra note 74,
at 1180-81.
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The drawback of an approach that focuses on informed consent as the
solution to the problem of coercive police-initiated encounters is that it
treats the concepts of consent and choice as non-contingent, thus leaving
them intact. In contrast, feminist critique subjects these concepts to close
scrutiny, especially in the context of rape. One of the first people to
scrutinize coercion and consent was Catherine MacKinnon.78 According to
MacKinnon, "rape is a sex crime that is not regarded as a crime when it
looks like sex.",7 9  The law defines rape as intercourse with force or
coercion and without consent. The problem is telling the difference.
The traditional legal starting point has been to define rape as distinct
from intercourse, though for women it may be difficult to distinguish
between the two under conditions of male dominance. 80 The law of rape,
MacKinnon argues, "presents consent as a free exercise of sexual choice
under conditions of equality of power without exposing the underlying
structure of constraint and disparity." 8' The deeper problem is that women
are socialized to respond to men with passive receptivity. They may have
or perceive no alternative to acquiescence, and may prefer it to the
escalated risk of injury and the humiliation of a lost fight. Some women,
on the other hand, may even eroticize dominance and submission. Sexual
intercourse may be deeply unwanted and the woman would never have
initiated it, yet no legal force may be present. "When sex is violent," wrote
MacKinnon, "women may have lost control over what is done to them,"
but "the absence of force does not ensure the presence of that control.,
82
In criticizing statutory rape laws, MacKinnon also argues that the "age
line under which girls are presumed to be disabled from consenting to
sex... rationalizes a condition of sexual coercion for all other women.,
83
By making consent irrelevant based on an assumption of powerlessness in
the most aggravated case for female powerlessness, the law defines those
above the age line as powerful, whether they actually have power to
consent or not. 84 As MacKinnon explains, "[d]ividing and protecting the
most vulnerable becomes a device for not protecting everyone who needs
it.,, 85
Similarly, by holding consent to a search as per se involuntary when
coerced by a claim of authority, as in Bumper, or by a preceding unlawful
seizure, as in Royer, and distinguishing these instances of coercion from all
other consensual police encounters, the Court is able to maintain the fiction
that police encounters typically are consensual and that consent to a search
78. MAcK1NNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 172-83 (1989).
79. Id. at 172.
80. Id. at 174.
81. Id. at 174-75.
82. Id. at 177-78.
83. Id. at 175.
84. Id. at 175-76.
85. Id.
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given under such circumstances is voluntary. The Court's jurisprudence
ensures that most encounters would not amount to a seizure. Consequently,
instances of per se involuntary consent are few and the overwhelming
majority of police-citizen encounters are deemed not to entail any coercion.
The individual is thus presumed to possess the power and choice to resist
the police, and this presumption results in the erosion of the Fourth
Amendment protections for most individuals.
A feminist inquiry criticizes the Court's conceptualization of consent
and coercion within search and seizure law at its most fundamental level.
Under conditions of male dominance, the intertwined notions of consent,
choice, and coercion do not help us distinguish between the "criminal" rape
and the "normal" intercourse, while at the same time they maintain the
invisibility of the underlying power disparities and constraints put in place
by the patriarchal structures. In the same way, the notions of consent and
coercion in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence operate to leave unexposed
and unchecked the inherent power disparities between the police and the
individual. For example, in stating that "[t]hose searches that are the
product of police coercion can be filtered out,"'86 the Court assumes that
most consented-to searches are not the product of police coercion, and that
it is possible to distinguish the former from the latter by maintaining
standards of consent and voluntariness. This has hardly been the case,
however.
Other feminist scholars follow MacKinnon in exposing the male
dominance and inherent power disparities that constrain women's choices
and their ability to differentiate, for example, between sex and rape based
on notions of consent and coercion. Dorothy Roberts agrees with
MacKinnon that the "pervasive effect of male dominance makes it
impossible to say definitively that some of women's sexual relations with
men (called sex) are 'free' and others (called rape) are 'coerced."'' 87 First,
the concept of choice, like force and consent, is a social construct. Second,
and more fundamentally, "a person's consent or choice does not necessarily
enhance her autonomy since she may agree to a transaction out of
obedience to a more powerful authority." 88 Consequently, the conception
of rape or sexual abuse in terms of "choice" leaves us where we started.
Roberts ultimately cautions us: "If hierarchies of power, supported by
deeply embedded images, determine whose autonomy matters, how can the
law make autonomy a meaningful concept?,
89
It is helpful to highlight the false dichotomy of consensual sex and rape
86. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229.
87. Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women's Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 359, 370 (1993).
88. Id. at 382.
89. Id. at 386.
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in the context of teen sex.90 Michelle Oberman argues that teen girls
experience many of their sexual encounters in the gray area between fully
consensual sex and rape. 91 Thus, as Oberman asserts:
in confining its inquiry to an assessment of whether consent
was given, modem statutory rape law loses sight of the
considerable coercion, violence, and ambivalence in
"consensual" teen sex. Even between age-mates in a situation
of apparent social equality power may be so vastly
imbalanced that evidence of verbal consent does not reveal the
true nature of a teenage sexual encounter... [The law]
classifies intercourse in a binary fashion as either consensual
sex or rape. However, from the girl's vantage point, her
consent may have been so fraught with ambivalence that it
was meaningless.92
Similar critiques of consent and free choice are offered by Katherine
Baker,93 and Jane Harris Aiken.94  Significantly, the feminist critique
reaches beyond sexuality and intercourse. As Ruth Gavison summarizes:
nothing we decide is really "free" in the sense that it is
determined only by our own wishes and preferences. We are
constrained by various limits: opportunities, socialization,
expectations, resources, and perceptions. Many of these
constraints are person-made and not inevitable. Similarly,
nothing is voluntary and equal ... Consent becomes anything
but the product of bargaining between free and equal
adults... . When women "choose" to marry, when women
"want" sex, when women "choose" to stay home and spend
time with their children rather than pursue their careers in
"workaholic" ways, women are not choosing freely, but rather
are selecting from choices mandated by social constraints and
90. Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory
Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15 (1994).
91. Id. at 70.
92. Id. at 70-72.
93. Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REv. 663, 665 (1999)
("The lines between pressure and force, strength and violence, and reluctance and refusal
are not nearly as clear as the law would like them to be. Lack of effective communication
makes it particularly hard for men and women to tell the difference between sex and rape.").
94. Jane Harris Aiken, Intimate Violence and the Problem of Consent, 48 S.C. L.
REV. 615 (1997) at 615 ("This essay is about ... the double binds women experience in
their intimate lives and the ways in which the law reinforces those binds by interpreting
women's constrained choices as consent."), and at 637 ("This essay suggests that courts
should scrutinize evidence of apparent consent more carefully to determine if it is the
product of severely constrained choices.").
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norms. The fact that many women feel happy and fulfilled in
these "choices" is not evidence that these "choices" are
free... Society has induced these feelings in women so that
women will not rebel against their exploitation and
oppression. Basically dependent upon men as breadwinners
and sources of power and status, women are not free to "exit"
and are therefore unable to negotiate the conditions of their
relationships from positions of freedom and equality ... many
decisions not subject to state regulation or physical coercion
are not authentic exercises of individual autonomy and choice;
much of what determines our conduct stems from external
constraints with diverse and pervasive sources. 95
Along these lines, Christo Lassiter exposes the power imbalance
inherent in police encounters in the context of traffic stops,96 and argues,
unlike Ward and Barrio, for the elimination of consent from the lexicon of
traffic stop interrogations altogether. 97 In making his argument, Lassiter
points to the way in which feminist scholars such as MacKinnon have
argued that women are unable to freely consent to sex due to the power
imbalance in a male-dominated society.98  Lassiter's argument is
compelling and attractive. Nonetheless, he seems to make the same
mistake as some feminists by painting a picture of complete subordination
and victimization, and of ruling out agency altogether.
The portrayal of women or racial minorities as wholly dominated
victims has produced much discussion within the feminist movement.
Kathryn Abrams, Elizabeth Schneider, and Martha Mahoney have been
particularly vocal in arguing that we should acknowledge the possibility
and complexity of women's agency and resistance in the face of
subordination. Abrams advances a theory of partial agency that attempts to
avoid extreme characterizations of women as either unconstrained agents or
wholly dominated victims, by balancing the backdrop of systemic, gender-
based oppression with specific descriptions of the limited forms of agency
and resistance that women do exercise despite oppression.99 She argues for
a feminist conception of the self that juxtaposes "women's capacity for
95. Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV.
16-18 (1992).
96. Christo Lassiter, Eliminating Consent from the Lexicon of Traffic Stop
Interrogations, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 79 (1998).
97. Id. at 82.
98. Id. at 131 n.259.
99. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761
(1990); Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theories, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995) [hereinafter Abrams, Sex Wars Redux]; Kathryn
Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self Direction, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 805 (1999) [hereinafter Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency].
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self-direction and resistance, on one hand, with often-internalized
patriarchal constraint, on the other."' 00 Premising legal analysis of private
choice on this model of individual agency, Abrams argues, would lead to
better interpretations of women's sexual decision making. For example,
coercion and consent should be defined more appropriately in rape cases. 01
Other scholars such as Elizabeth Schneider focus on exposing the false
dichotomy between women's victimization and women's agency and argue
that the portrayal of women as solely victims or agents is neither accurate
nor adequate to explain the complex realities of women's lives. Schneider
calls for feminists and practitioners to seek to understand both the social
context of women's oppression, which shapes women's choices and
constrains women's agency and resistance, and to recognize women's
agency and resistance in a more nuanced way.
102
Martha Mahoney similarly argues that the legal images of battered
women that have emerged from battered women's self-defense advocacy
often depict them as pathologically passive in the face of their partners'
abuse. But the reality of most battered women's lives is far more complex.
Women may be unable to bring a battering relationship to a rapid close, but
they may assert themselves in a variety of ways that contribute to their
security - and to that of their children - and equip them ultimately to end
the relationship. For example, they may gather funds, information, and
support that ultimately help them to escape the relationship, or they may
strategize actively in the face of separation abuse, which exposes women to
increased violence when they try to leave, and succeed at separating after
multiple attempts. These aspects of battered women's acts need to be
recognized as a form of agency. They permit battered women to protect
their children, to preserve specific portions of their lives, and in some
cases, to exit their abusive relationships.'0 3
In sum, instead of positing that those who suffer oppressions lack
agency due to their victimization, we should acknowledge that the agency
of anyone who is oppressed, especially those subjected to multiple
oppressions, exists within a complex arena of fractured structural forces
and pressures. A fair presentation of a situation should thus evaluate one's
100. Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 99, at 346.
101. Id. at 361-62.
102. See, e.g., Elizabeth Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-defense
Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195
(1986) [hereinafter Schneider, Describing and Changing] (focusing on tensions between
themes of victimization and agency in problem of expert testimony on battering); Elizabeth
Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in
Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520 (1992) [hereinafter Schneider, Particularity
and Generality]; Elizabeth Schneider, Feminism and the False Dichotomy of Victimization
and Agency, 38 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 387 (1993) [hereinafter Schneider, Feminism and the
False Dichotomy].
103. See, e.g., Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the
Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1991).
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agency within this context. While we must stop ignoring the structural
forces and constraints that shape and limit our agency, we should not take
these forces and constraints to be all that there is. The point is not that we
should read every story as a story of subordination. Rather we must "never
explain or close off any story into being just one story."' 10 4
Once we are armed with the understanding that agency and choice are
socially constrained by power hierarchies, and that agency and resistance
are possible within a constrained and subordinated life, a critical re-
examination of Bumper v. North Carolina'0 5 is possible. Recall that in
Bumper the Court held that Mrs. Leath's consent was per se tainted with
coercion.10 6 It pointed out that Mrs. Leath, "a 66-year-old Negro widow,
[who lived] in a house located in a rural area at the end of an isolated mile-
long dirt road," was approached at her door by four white law enforcement
officers claiming to have a warrant to search her house. 10 7 Such a factual
description seems to recognize that social factors usually associated with
subordination and powerlessness - such as race, age, and gender - may
have limited, if not eliminated Mrs. Leath's ability to refuse the officers'
claimed legal right to search her house.
However, it did not occur to the Court to consider whether, even within
the context of power disparities between Mrs. Leath and the officers, it was
possible for Mrs. Leath to act as an agent. It failed to perceive her conduct
as a possible act of resistance to subordination, although her testimony may
be interpreted to support this idea. Mrs. Leath testified,
He just came on in and said he had a warrant to search the
house, and he didn't read it to me or nothing. So, I just told
him to come on in and go ahead and search, and I went on
about my work. I wasn't concerned what he was about.
He said he was the law and had a search warrant to search
the house, why I thought he could go ahead. I believed he had
a search warrant. I took him at his word. . . . I had no
objection to them making a search of my house. I was willing
to let them look in any room or drawer in my house they
wanted to. Nobody threatened me with anything. Nobody
told me they were going to hurt me if I didn't let them search
my house ... I let them search and it was all my own free
will. Nobody forced me at all. I just give them a free will to
0
104. Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural
Defense," 17 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 57, 98 (1994).
105. 391 U.S. 543.
106. Id. at 550.
107. Id. at 546.
[Vol. 16:1
look because I felt like the boy wasn't guilty.
0 8
Yet the Court explicitly dismisses any elements of agency in Mrs.
Leath's testimony by explaining that the transcript is written in a first
person narrative rather than the actual questions and answers, the effect of
which is to put into the mouth of the witness some of the words of the
attorneys. It remarks that "[iun the case of an obviously compliant witness
like Mrs. Leath, the result is a narrative that has the tone of decisiveness but
is shot through with contradictions."' 0 9 But since the Court did not observe
Mrs. Leath on the witness stand, the basis of its conclusion that she was
obviously a compliant witness who had words "put in her mouth" is
unclear. If the Court indeed regarded her race, gender, and age as proxies
of submission, this characterization of Mrs. Leath is a natural extension of
her overall portrayal as powerless and obedient.
Whereas for the Bumper majority Mrs. Leath is only a victim, for the
dissenters her agency is uncompromised. Justice Black concluded that
Mrs. Leath voluntarily and freely consented to the search. 10 In his eyes,
Mrs. Leath's readiness to permit the search was the action of a
person so conscious of her innocence, so proud of her own
home, that she was not going to require a search warrant, thus
indicating a doubt about the rectitude of her household. There
are such people in this world of ours, and the evidence causes
me to believe Mrs. Leath is one of them."'
This characterization of Mrs. Leath accords with the Court's other
consent-to-search cases, where it typically sees agency and uncoerced
choices where they are most likely absent.
For both the Bumper majority and the dissent, a person is either an
agent or a victim, wholly free and unconstrained or completely submissive.
Instead, a feminist consciousness attempts to break out of these simplistic,
one-dimensional dichotomies. It understands that our stories are shot
through with contradiction because this is how we experience our lives -
in different shades of gray rather than in black and white. The
contradictions of our lives are evident in Illinois v. Rodriguez," 2 which is
one of several cases involving third party consent to a search. Generally, a
third party who shares common authority over property with a defendant
may also give an effective consent to a search of that property.1 3 Common
108. Id. at 546-47, 547 n.8.
109. Id. at 547 n.8. (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 556-57 (Black, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 556-57.
112. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
113. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (holding that consent is
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authority rests on mutual use of the property so that it is reasonable to
recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the
inspection in their own right. 1 4 In Rodriguez, the Court expanded the
third-party consent doctrine by holding that a third party can give an
effective consent even though the third party has no actual authority to give
consent.
115
In Rodriguez, a woman summoned police officers to her house to
report that her daughter Gail Fischer had been beaten. Fischer, who
showed signs of severe beating, told the police that her boyfriend Ed
Rodriguez assaulted her earlier that day in another apartment, where he was
currently sleeping. She agreed to travel there with the police and unlock
the door with her key so that the officers could enter and arrest Rodriguez
for battery. After entry into the apartment, the police officers found drugs
and related paraphernalia in the apartment and found Rodriguez sleeping in
the bedroom. 1 6 The facts tell a story of a woman who attempts to bring a
violent relationship to an end, first by leaving her abuser and then by
turning to the police in an attempt to bring about his arrest. The Court
however does not see this picture, or chooses to ignore it.
Without acknowledging that life is filled with contradiction, the Court
manipulated the contradictions in Fischer's life and construed both the
evidence of her victimization and the evidence of her resistance against her
abuser, in finding that she lacked actual authority to consent to the search.
The Court first held that Fischer obviously had no common authority
over the apartment and therefore had no actual authority to consent to the
search. 117 Although Fischer and her two young children had lived with
Rodriguez in the apartment beginning since December 1984, she and the
children moved out on July 1, 1985, almost a month before the search, and
went to live with her mother. Fischer had taken her clothing and the
children's clothing with her, though she left behind some furniture and
household effects. In addition, she was not allowed to invite others to the
apartment on her own; she never went to the apartment when Rodriguez
was not there; her name was not on the lease nor did she contribute to the
rent; and she had taken the key without Rodriguez's knowledge. 18
The Court next held that the warrantless entry into Rodriguez's home
would nonetheless be valid if the officers reasonably believed that Fischer
had authority to consent." 9 The officers' belief must be judged against an
objective standard: "Would the facts available to the officer at the moment
valid if "obtained from a third-party who possessed common authority over.., the premises
or effects sought to be inspected").
114. ld. at 171 n.7.
115. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186.
116. Id. at 179-80.
117. Id. at 182.
118. Id. at 181.
119. Id. at 188-89.
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party
had authority over the premises. 1 20 The Court therefore remanded the case
to the lower court for consideration of that question. While the three
dissenting Justices rejected this apparent authority test, they agreed that
Fischer had no actual authority to consent to the search.1
21
Through a feminist gaze, however, the Court could have reached a
better understanding as to why Fischer was not named on the lease and did
not contribute to the rent, as to why she was not allowed to invite friends
and not allowed in the apartment when Rodriguez was away. These are
manifestations of the control and subordination that can exist within an
abusive relationship, especially when exacerbated by economic inferiority.
Instead, the Court blinds itself to this reality and construes these facts as
evidence that Fischer had no control over the apartment she shared with her
boyfriend. From a feminist stance, due to the power disparity between the
two, it should not follow from Fischer's lack of control over the apartment
that she lacked control to give consent to search. Likewise, the Court could
have construed the fact that Fischer recently left the apartment with her
children and only a few personal belongings as a desperate attempt to resist
the violence and protect herself and her children by leaving the abuser.
Similarly, it could have appreciated her act of resistance to her
subordination and abuse in calling the police and accompanying them to
the apartment to arrest Rodriguez after a "separation attack." But the Court
chose to ignore this complex picture of subordination and resistance,
victimhood and agency, and thus perpetuated Fischer's subordinated status
and disempowerment.
Not only does the Court's denial of Fischer's actual authority to
consent to the search invalidate her agency and perpetuate her
subordination, but also its construction of the apparent authority test has a
similar effect. Rather than validating her act of self-actualization as an
agent capable of authorizing the search of the apartment, the Court
supplants Fischer's perspective with that of the reasonable officer. The
articulated reasonable person test has the potential of validating, hence
empowering the police officer's conduct, while at the same time silencing
the individual by rendering her perspective irrelevant and not worthy of
legal acknowledgement.
Both Bumper and Rodriguez demonstrate the multiplicity and
complexity of agency and coercion. Significantly, however, these two
cases also expose the gender-oppressive nature of this binary legal
discourse, which may explain why the Court is so insistent on maintaining
the fiction of consent and coercion. In both cases, the Court rejects
possible manifestations of actual agency and invalidates the consent to the
120. Id. at 188 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).
121. Id. at 193-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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search given by the individual. In contrast, its jurisprudence in the other
cases maintains a fiction of consensual police encounters and searches, and
relies on abstract notions of unconstrained agency and free choice to
validate the individual's consent to a search. This inconsistency serves to
perpetuate male ideology through the mechanisms of law and maintain the
powerlessness and exclusion of women, minorities and other subordinated
members of society.
Encounters between the police and the individual cannot be
characterized as equal in power under our current social hierarchical
structures. Rather they reflect the invisible subordination of the individual
to the power of the patriarchal state and law. In most cases, the individual
would in fact be powerless to resist these forces and would quietly submit
by consenting to the search, absent meaningful choices from his or her
subordinated position. Every time the Court insists on characterizing this
submission as a true act of agency and free-willed choice, oblivious to
power disparities and social constraints, it reifies the individual's
subordinated state. This is especially true for women and minorities whose
subordination to the police is but one manifestation of their all-
encompassing social subordination.
Nonetheless, resistance and empowerment are possible even under
conditions of subordination. The Court, however, cannot allow that to
happen if the patriarchal structure is to remain in place. Therefore, the
Court must reject any glimpses of agency and empowerment on behalf of
the otherwise subordinated individual. The Bumper Court and the
Rodriguez Court do so by portraying a picture of complete lack of agency
where the reality from the point of view of individual woman may have
been one of control and empowerment rather than submission to authority.
By thus rejecting these women's attempts at self-empowerment and
trumping their perspectives, the Court perpetuates women's subordination
and sends the message that there is no escape from life of subordination
and powerlessness if you are a woman, a minority, or both. In so doing, it
perpetuates the oppression of all women and racial minorities, and
reinforces power as the basic norm that structures our society, to the
disadvantage of us all.
IV. ENGENDERING CONSENT AND COERCION
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has purportedly paid attention to
exertions of power and authority by infusing search and seizure law with
notions of consent and coercion. Nonetheless, as construed from the
viewpoint of white men, only overt traditional manifestations of force and
coercion are acknowledged doctrinally as being real, while the basic
assumption of free will and agency remains unchallenged. Since broader
socially oppressive forces are unaccounted for within our current
jurisprudence most people are left unprotected when their exchanges with
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the police are deemed consensual. Thus, the current paradigm of power,
consent, and coercion within the Fourth Amendment may have actually
contributed to the exclusion of alternative conceptualizations of power that
would truly eradicate the oppression of those at the bottom of the social
hierarchies.
It is time the Court erased the artificial line drawn between voluntary
consent and coercion, and acknowledged the complexities of life that result
in the mutual construction and inextricable connection of consent and
coercion. In assessing an encounter between the police and an individual
we must acknowledge the multiple ways in which the state manifests power
over individuals beyond notions of physical force or other forms of overt
coercion. We need to focus on police coercion and abuse in terms of
control and domination based on situated multifaceted social power webs.
We need to focus on the power webs of gender, class, and race among
others, which enable the police and the state to subordinate individuals in
seemingly non-abusive ways. At the same time, we need to constantly
reexamine the notion of consent and the possibility of choice under such
conditions of power disparity. While we should question choices that seem
to perpetuate the individual's subordination, we should also strive to affirm
choices that empower the individual and truly guarantee his or her security
as well the security of our society.
In conceptualizing domination and disempowerment, we need to
recognize that human beings are formed in their preferences, abilities, and
capacities to respond to coercion, by material circumstances and
relationships or affiliations with others. A crucial part of acknowledging
our social situatedness would be to highlight the formative and covert
effects of inequalities of power.1 22 The law must acknowledge how we are
socialized, especially along lines of gender and race, to submit to those in
power in the name of cooperation and obedience. It also needs to
understand how different power webs make us vulnerable to different
things, at different places, and at different times. For each individual, but
especially for members of traditionally subordinated groups, the point of
most powerlessness, and hence most vulnerability to abuse, arises from
various interlocking power structures in varying degrees.
Women's experiences are living proof of this. Women experience their
lives both as victims of oppression and as agents resisting it; as both
subordinated by privacy and empowered by it; as both rational and
emotional. One lesson from feminist jurisprudence lies in the rejection of
simple dichotomies and the abandonment of the either/or that characterize
our current jurisprudence. On many occasions the police dominate the
encounter with the individual. Yet in some instances, particular individuals
successfully resist the oppressive power of the state, and may even
122. Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency, supra note 99, at 845.
Winter 20041 CONSENT ENGENDERED
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
dominate the encounter. A simplistic and dichotomized approach to free
will and coercion, agency and victimization, power and powerlessness,
cannot ensure that both the individual and the police officers will be
secured, respected, and valued as human beings.
The question then becomes how to choose among the competing stories
of the circumstances leading to a search from the perspectives of the police
officer and the individual without invalidating the experience of one or the
other in a way that is as oppressive as the legacy of our current
jurisprudence. When both the individual and the police officer tell
compelling stories of consent how can we know which is right? I suggest
we embrace the values of anti-subordination and empowerment to guide us
in resolving power struggles within the context of the Fourth Amendment.
We should be guided by our substantive commitment to focus on
power webs and interlocking systems of subordination, and by our
commitment to redistribute and share social power. Our substantive
commitments do not tell us what to do, but they may and should help us
select from plausible, competing choices in a given circumstance.
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Therefore, our focus on power hierarchies may enable us to choose among
these competing realities. In this latter function, a jurisprudence of power
is best captured in the principles of anti-subordination and empowerment.
Valuing the principle of antisubordination means a serious commitment
to evaluating and eradicating all forms of oppression. 124  We should
explicitly examine whether an individual was less powerful than the police
in the specific case, and whether the police exploited or benefited, directly
or indirectly, from its power over the individual. We can assume that
typically the police are more powerful than the individual, even though this
is due to the operation of social forces outside the specific encounter and to
the individual's social position. We can also assume that the police benefit
from its privileged position of power and the relative powerlessness of the
individual, even if the officer does not intentionally exploit the
vulnerability of the individual. Finally, we can assume that the individual
is subordinated at least to the extent that the police benefit from her relative
powerlessness. Consequently, the burden should be on the state to
persuade us that no power disparity, in its broadest sense, operated to the
disadvantage of the individual, or that the individual acted out of true
agency and empowerment.
This moral choice to commit to antisubordination would hold police
officers and other government agents to a heightened standard in light of
the significant power they typically have over the individual by the virtue
of their position of authority and social legitimization. As the powerful
123. Minow, supra note 1, at 91.
124. See Volpp, supra note 104, at 97-98 (arguing that antisubordination is a value
that the legal system must factor into the decision whether to present testimony as to a
defendant's cultural background.).
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party, the police would have a moral obligation to see the world from the
point of view of those they govern or control, and to exercise its power in
the interests of the governed individual. 125 Judges will also be bound by
this heightened moral obligation. They should consider the human
consequences of their decisions, rather than insulating themselves in
abstractions. 26  The Court should not let the formalities of consent
determine the limits of our inquiry into the police and the individual's
conduct. Instead, the Court must identify the power matrix between the
parties, considering such factors as the gender, race, and class of both the
officer and the individual, and any other factors which may contribute to an
imbalance of power in the specific case at hand, such as general police
practices or general attitudes about crime and security.
The court must then determine whether such power disparities were
exploited in an impermissible way. In examining whether the government
officers unfairly benefit from such power imbalances, our inquiry should
not be limited to intentional exploitation of power. Power imbalances are
often invisible and appear natural. However, as long as people are
disadvantaged because of their non-white race, for example, white people
enjoy the privilege and power that accompanies whiteness. As long as
male ideology and perspective dominate the world, men enjoy the social
status and privilege of those on the top of the hierarchy, regardless of
whether they harbor personal hostility toward those beneath them or not.
This is exactly why we impose a moral obligation on the powerful to act
from the perspective of those less powerful.
Thus, in evaluating the consensual nature of the search and of the
encounter between the police and the individual we should primarily focus
on the actual state of mind of the individual. We should attempt to evaluate
his or her agency and choices within the complex arena of fractured
structural forces and pressures, especially historic indicators of multiple
social oppressions. This would require asking different sets of questions.
We should ask, for example, did the individual act with a consciousness of
his or her social position? What is the range of experience that informed
her ability to imagine alternative choices? How did he feel when he
"consented?"
This kind of inquiry may not necessarily steer our ultimate choice
along lines of what we have traditionally regarded as reason and rationality.
The stories told by the individuals involved evoke emotions that eventually
may be all that we can rely on in making our choices. But this is not
something to fear, but rather something to be emulated. We need to learn
125. See Deborah Zalesne, The Intersection of Socioeconomic Class and Gender in
Hostile Housing Environment Claims Under Title VIII: Who is the Reasonable Person?, 38
B.C. L. REv. 861, 893 (1997).
126. Minow, supra note 1, at 89.
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to accept contradiction, ambiguity, and ambivalence in our lives. 127 We
should stop fearing that we will be unable to make judgments if we
embrace complexity and subjectivity. We can and do make judgments all
the time, in a way committed to making meaning.
28
When our conscious examination of the power structures leaves us
equally moved by the stories of the officer and the individual, our
substantive commitment to antisubordination and redistribution of power
should lead us, in most cases, to choose to empower the individual, if only
because, until now, the jurisprudence has "erred" on the side of the police.
In so redistributing power, the benefit of validating and empowering those
who have thus far been denied power outweighs the losses of excess power
and privilege that police have enjoyed. But make no mistake, these are
explicit moral choices that do not hide behind abstractions of consent and
coercion. It is my choice of who should carry the burden of persuasion, my
choice of whose side to take when in doubt or when equally persuaded, and
my choice about who should gain power and who should lose power when
sharing is impossible. This is my way of making meaning of consent,
coercion and all that is in-between.
127. Schneider, Feminism and the False Dichotomy, supra note 102, at 397.
128. Minow, supra note 1, at 90-91.
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